One of the recent concepts that has started to gain traction in certain segments of the Bitcoin community is the perspective articulated by both myself and others, referred to as “Bitcoin dominance maximalism” or simply “Bitcoin maximalism” for brevity – fundamentally, the notion that a landscape filled with various competitive cryptocurrencies is undesirable, that launching “yet another coin” is misguided, and that it is both virtuous and unavoidable for Bitcoin to ascend to a monopolistic status in the realm of cryptocurrencies. It is important to note that this differs from a mere aspiration to enhance Bitcoin; such intentions are undoubtedly constructive, and I continue to actively support Bitcoin through my Python library pybitcointools. Instead, this stance asserts that creating anything outside of Bitcoin is the only morally defensible approach, declaring all else as unethical (see this post for an overtly antagonistic illustration). Proponents of Bitcoin maximalism frequently invoke “network effects” as a rationale, contending that resisting these effects is an exercise in futility. Nevertheless, is this belief genuinely beneficial for the cryptocurrency community? And is the fundamental assertion that network effects are a formidable force favoring the eventual supremacy of already established currencies indeed accurate, and even if it is, does this logic lead to the conclusions its supporters believe it does?
The Technicals
To begin, an overview of the technical methodologies in question. Generally, there are three methods to establish a new crypto protocol:
- Construct on Bitcoin the blockchain, but not Bitcoin the currency (metacoins, e.g., various functionalities of Counterparty)
- Construct on Bitcoin the currency, but not Bitcoin the blockchain (sidechains)
- Develop a completely independent platform
Meta-protocols are relatively straightforward to define: they are frameworks that attribute a secondary implication to specific types of uniquely formatted Bitcoin transactions, and the existing state of the meta-protocol can be ascertained by scanning the blockchain for authorized metacoin transactions and processing the valid ones sequentially. The first meta-protocol to be established was Mastercoin; Counterparty is a more recent addition. Meta-protocols significantly expedite the development of new protocols and enable them to directly benefit from the security of Bitcoin’s blockchain, albeit at a significant drawback: meta-protocols do not align with light client protocols, so the only effective means to utilize a meta-protocol is through a trusted intermediary.
Sidechains are somewhat more intricate. The central concept revolves around a “two-way-pegging” mechanism, where a “parent chain” (typically Bitcoin) and a “sidechain” share a mutual currency by allowing a unit of one to be convertible into a unit of the other. The process is as follows. First, to obtain a unit of side-coin, a user must transfer a unit of parent-coin into a designated “lockbox script,” and subsequently provide a cryptographic proof verifying this transaction occurred to the sidechain. Once this transaction is confirmed, the user receives the side-coin and can utilize it freely. When any user holding a unit of side-coin wishes to convert it back into parent-coin, they simply need to eliminate the side-coin, and then submit proof that this transaction occurred to a lockbox script on the main chain. The lockbox script would then authenticate the proof, and if all is verified, it would release the parent-coin for the individual who submitted the side-coin-destroying transaction to utilize.
Regrettably, it is impractical to utilize the Bitcoin blockchain and currency simultaneously; the fundamental technical reason is that nearly all notable metacoins involve transferring coins under more intricate conditions than those supported by the Bitcoin protocol itself, necessitating a distinct “coin” (e.g., MSC in Mastercoin, XCP in Counterparty). As will be demonstrated, each of these strategies presents its distinct advantages, along with inherent flaws. This aspect is crucial; particularly, note that the enthusiasm recently displayed by many Bitcoin maximalists regarding Counterparty forking Ethereum was misplaced, as Counterparty-based Ethereum smart contracts cannot manipulate BTC currency units, and the asset they are more likely to promote (and indeed already have promoted) is the XCP.
Network Effects
Next, let us delve into the core argument being presented here: network effects. Generally, network effects can be succinctly defined: a network effect is a characteristic of a system that renders the system intrinsically more valuable as its user base expands. For instance, a language exhibits a strong network effect: Esperanto, even if it is theoretically superior to English in a vacuum, is considerably less useful in practice since the primary function of a language is to facilitate communication with others, and few people speak Esperanto. Conversely, a single road has a negative network effect: the more it is used, the more congested it becomes.
To accurately comprehend the network effects at play in the context of cryptoeconomics, we must precisely identify these effects and the specific entities to which each effect is linked. Therefore, to begin, let us enumerate several of the significant effects (see here and here for primary sources):
- Security effect: systems that achieve wider adoption derive their consensus from larger consensus groups, making them harder to attack.
- Payment system network effect: payment systems that are recognized by…more vendors are more appealing to consumers, and payment systems utilized by a greater number of consumers are more appealing to vendors.
- Developer network effect: there are more individuals interested in creating tools that operate with platforms that have widespread acceptance, and the higher quantity of these tools will enhance the platform’s usability.
- Integration network effect: third-party platforms will be more inclined to integrate with a platform that has broad adoption, and the increased number of these tools will facilitate easier usage of the platform.
- Size stability effect: currencies with a larger market capitalization tend to exhibit greater stability, and more established cryptocurrencies are perceived as having a greater likelihood (and thus, by self-fulfilling prophecy, genuinely do have a greater likelihood) of maintaining a non-zero value far into the future.
- Unit of account network effect: currencies that are highly prominent and stable are utilized as a unit of account for pricing goods and services; moreover, it is cognitively simpler to track one’s funds in the same unit as the prices being measured.
- Market depth effect: larger currencies possess greater market depth on exchanges, enabling users to convert larger amounts of funds into and out of that currency without incurring significant impacts on market prices.
- Market spread effect: larger currencies demonstrate increased liquidity (i.e., narrower spread) on exchanges, facilitating more efficient conversions back and forth.
- Intrapersonal single-currency preference effect: users that already employ a currency for a specific function are inclined to utilize it for other purposes as well, due to reduced cognitive costs and because they can sustain a lower total liquid balance among all cryptocurrencies without incurring interchange fees.
- Interpersonal single-currency preference effect: users tend to favor using the same currency as others to evade interchange fees during regular transactions.
- Marketing network effect: items that are utilized by more individuals are more visible and thus more likely to be discovered by new users. Additionally, users possess greater knowledge about more prominent systems, leading to lesser concerns about potential exploitation by unscrupulous entities selling them something detrimental that they do not comprehend.
- Regulatory legitimacy network effect: regulators are less likely to target something if it is well-established, as doing so would provoke more backlash from the public.
The initial observation we make is that these network effects are quite neatly categorized into multiple groups: blockchain-specific network effects (1), platform-specific network effects (2-4), currency-specific network effects (5-10), and general network effects (11-12), which largely serve as public goods throughout the entire cryptocurrency sector. There exists a significant potential for confusion in this area, since Bitcoin functions simultaneously as a blockchain, a currency, and a platform; however, it is crucial to distinctly differentiate among the three. The clearest means to separate them is as follows:
- A currency is something utilized as a medium of exchange or a store of value; for instance, dollars, BTC, and DOGE.
- A platform refers to a collection of interoperable tools and infrastructure that can be employed to carry out specific tasks; regarding currencies, the fundamental type of platform is the assemblage of a payment network alongside the necessary tools to send and receive transactions within that network, although other forms of platforms may also develop.
- A blockchain is a consensus-driven distributed database that modifies itself based on the content of valid transactions according to a predetermined set of rules; for example, the Bitcoin blockchain, the Litecoin blockchain, etc.
To understand how currencies and platforms are entirely distinct, the best illustration is found within fiat currencies. Credit cards, for instance, represent a highly multi-currency platform. An individual with a credit card from Canada linked to a bank account in Canadian dollars can make purchases at a merchant in Switzerland that accepts Swiss francs, where both parties barely acknowledge the difference. Conversely, although both cash and PayPal can be based on the US dollar, they are fundamentally different platforms; a merchant who only accepts cash may encounter challenges when dealing with a customer possessing only a PayPal account.
Regarding the distinction between platforms and blockchains, a prime example is the Bitcoin payment protocol and proof of existence. Despite utilizing the same blockchain, they represent entirely separate applications; users of one application lack awareness of how to interpret transactions associated with the other, and it is relatively straightforward to recognize how they gain from entirely different network effects, allowing one to gain traction independent of the other. Note that protocols like proof of existence and Factom predominantly fall outside this discussion; their primary aim is to embed hashes into the most secure ledger available, and while a better ledger has yet to emerge, they should certainly utilize Bitcoin, particularly because they can employ Merkle trees to condense a vast number of proofs into a single hash within one transaction.
Network Effects and Metacoins
Now, within this framework, let us analyze metacoins and sidechains individually. For metacoins, the situation is straightforward: metacoins are constructed on the Bitcoin blockchain, rather than Bitcoin the platform or Bitcoin the currency. To illustrate the former, it is essential to note that users are required to download an entirely new set of software packages to process Bitcoin transactions. A slight cognitive network effect arises from the ability to utilize the existing Bitcoin private/public key pairs and addresses; however, this constitutes a network effect for the amalgamation of ECDSA, SHA256+RIPEMD160, and base 58, and more broadly the entire concept of cryptocurrency—not specifically the Bitcoin platform; Dogecoin reaps the exact same rewards. To demonstrate the latter, let us mention that, as previously stated, Counterparty possesses its own internal currency, known as XCP. Henceforth, while metacoins benefit from the network effect of Bitcoin’s blockchain security, they do not automatically inherit all the platform-specific and currency-specific network effects.
Certainly, the detachment of metacoins from Bitcoin’s platform and currency isn’t absolute. To begin with, although Counterparty is not “on” the Bitcoin platform, it can be meaningfully described as being “close” to the Bitcoin platform—one can efficiently exchange BTC and XCP back and forth with minimal cost. Cross-chaincentralized or decentralized exchange, while feasible, tends to be significantly slower and more expensive. Secondly, certain attributes of Counterparty, particularly its token sale capability, do not necessitate the transfer of currency units under any circumstances that the Bitcoin protocol does not endorse, thus allowing individuals to utilize that capability without needing to acquire XCP, directly using BTC instead. Lastly, transaction charges in all metacoins may be settled using BTC, meaning that in the case of purely non-financial applications, metacoins genuinely take full advantage of Bitcoin’s currency influence, although it should be observed that in most non-financial instances, developers are accustomed to messaging being complimentary, hence persuading anyone to engage with a non-financial blockchain dapp at $0.05 per transaction is likely to be a challenging endeavor.
In several of these applications – particularly, perhaps to the chagrin of Bitcoin maximalists, Counterparty’s crypto 2.0 token sales, the urge to transfer rapidly to and from Bitcoin, as well as the capability to utilize it directly, might indeed foster a platform network effect that compensates for the absence of secure light client functionality and the potential for improvements in blockchain speed and scalability. It is in these situations that metacoins may identify their market niche. However, it is indisputable that metacoins are certainly not a one-size-fits-all remedy; it is irrational to assume that Bitcoin full nodes will possess the computational capability to manage every single crypto transaction anyone might ever wish to perform, and thus a transition to either scalable architectures or multichain environments will inevitably be required.
Network Effects and Sidechains
Sidechains exhibit the contrary characteristics of metacoins. They are constructed on Bitcoin as the currency, thereby benefiting from the currency network effects of Bitcoin; however, they are otherwise entirely comparable to fully autonomous chains and share the same attributes. This results in various advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side, it implies that while “sidechains” in themselves do not serve as a scalability solution due to their failure to address the security issue, forthcoming developments in multichain, sharding, or other scalability methods are all accessible for them to implement.
On the flip side, they do not gain from Bitcoin’s platform network effects. One needs to download specific software to interact with a sidechain, and one must explicitly transfer their bitcoins onto a sidechain to use it – a procedure that is just as challenging as exchanging them for a new currency within a new network through a decentralized exchange. In fact, Blockstream personnel have even acknowledged that the conversion process for side-coins back into bitcoins is relatively ineffective, to the extent that most individuals looking to shift their bitcoins back and forth will indeed utilize the exact same centralized or decentralized exchange methods as would be employed to transition into a different currency on an independent blockchain.
Furthermore, it should be noted that there exists one security strategy that independent networks can adopt which is unavailable to sidechains: proof of stake. This situation arises for two reasons. First, a crucial argument supporting proof of stake posits that even a successful attack against it will be costly for the aggressor, as the attacker will need to retain their currency units deposited while witnessing their value plummet significantly as the market recognizes that the coin is compromised. This incentive effect does not exist if the only currency within a network is linked to an external asset whose value is not so intrinsically connected to the success of that network.
Secondly, proof of stake derives much of its security from the fact that the process of accumulating 50% of a coin to execute a takeover assault will, in itself, inflate the coin’s price significantly, rendering the attack even more costly for the aggressor. In a proof of stake sidechain, however, one can effortlessly transfer a substantial number of coins into a chain from the parent chain, thus executing the attack without affecting the asset price whatsoever. It is pertinent to note that both of these points remain valid even if Bitcoin itself transitions to proof of stake for its safeguarding. Consequently, if one holds the belief that proof of stake represents the future, then both metacoins and sidechains (or at least pure sidechains) become quite dubious, leading to the conclusion that for that purely technical basis, Bitcoin maximalism (or, for that matter, ether maximalism, or any other type of currency maximalism) becomes untenable.
Currency Network Effects, Revisited
Overall, the outcome from the above two points is twofold. First, there is no universal and scalable method allowing users to capitalize on Bitcoin’s platform network effects. Any software solution facilitating the easy transfer of Bitcoin users’ funds to sidechains can be swiftly adapted into a solution that allows Bitcoin users to just as easily convert their funds into an independent currency on a different chain. Conversely, however, currency network effects present a different scenario and may indeed demonstrate a substantial advantage for Bitcoin-based sidechains over entirely independent networks. So, what exactly do these effects entail and how significant is each one in this context? Let’s revisit them:
- Size-stability network effect (larger currencies exhibit more stability) – this network effect is genuine, and Bitcoin has been demonstrated to be less volatile than smaller coins.
- Unit of account network effect (very large currencies tend to become units of account, resulting in greater purchasing power stability through price stickiness as well as higher visibility) – regrettably, Bitcoin is unlikely to achieve sufficient stability to activate this effect; the best empirical evidence we can observe for this is likely the valuation history of gold.
- Market depth effect (larger currencies accommodate larger transactions without slippage and have a narrower bid/ask spread) – these effects are legitimate to a certain extent, but beyond that point (possibly a market cap of $10-$100M), the market depth is sufficiently adequate, and the spread is low enough for nearly all types of transactions, rendering additional gains minimal.
- Single-currency preference effect (individuals prefer to engage with fewer currencies and favor utilizing the same currencies that others are using) – the intrapersonal and interpersonal dimensions of this effect are valid, yet it should be noted that (i) the intrapersonal aspect only pertains to individual users, not to interactions between users, which does not inhibit an ecosystem with multiple favored global currencies from existing, and (ii) the interpersonal dimension is minor as interchange fees, especially in crypto, tend to be quite low, less than 0.30%,and is expected to drop to nearly zero with decentralized trading platforms.
Thus, the effect of single-currency preference is probably the primary worry, trailed by the stability effect in size, while the market depth impacts are likely quite minimal once a cryptocurrency achieves a considerable scale. Nevertheless, it is essential to acknowledge that the preceding points contain several significant caveats. First, if (1) and (2) prevail, then we are aware of distinct strategies for constructing a novel coin that could be more stable than Bitcoin even at a lesser scale; therefore, these certainly do not favor Bitcoin.
Secondly, those same strategies (especially the exogenous ones) can indeed be employed to design a stable coin that is tied to a currency possessing significantly larger network effects than Bitcoin itself; specifically, the US dollar. The US dollar dwarfs Bitcoin by thousands of times, people are already accustomed to using it as a reference, and most crucially, it retains its purchasing power at a reasonable rate in the short to medium term without extreme volatility. Employees of Blockstream, the organization behind sidechains, have frequently advocated for sidechains using the tagline “innovation without speculation“; however, this slogan overlooks that Bitcoin itself is inherently speculative and as demonstrated by the history of gold will likely remain so, thus attempting to instate Bitcoin as the sole cryptoasset essentially compels all participants in cryptoeconomic systems to take part in speculation. Want genuine innovation devoid of speculation? Then perhaps we should all immerse ourselves in some US dollar stablecoin maximalism instead.
In conclusion, concerning transaction fees specifically, the individual single-currency preference effect arguably vanishes entirely. The rationale is that the amounts involved are so minimal ($0.01-$0.05 per transaction) that a dapp can merely extract $1 from a user’s Bitcoin wallet as needed, without informing the user that alternative currencies are available, thereby diminishing the cognitive burden of managing even hundreds of currencies to zero. The non-urgent nature of this token exchange also implies that the client can act as a market maker while transferring coins between chains, potentially even profiting from the currency interchange bid/ask spread. Moreover, since the user does not witness gains and losses, and given that the user’s average balance is so low, the central limit theorem ensures with overwhelming probability that the fluctuations will predominantly cancel each other out, making stability quite inconsequential. Thus, we can assert that alternative tokens intended primarily as “cryptofuels” do not experience any deficiencies associated with currency-specific network effects. Let a multitude of cryptofuels flourish.
Incentive and Psychological Arguments
There exists another category of argument, which might be labeled as a network effect but not entirely so, regarding why a service utilizing Bitcoin as currency will excel: the incentivized promotion by the Bitcoin community. The reasoning is as follows. Services and platforms grounded in Bitcoin the currency (and to a marginally lesser degree, services based on Bitcoin the platform) enhance the value of Bitcoin. Hence, Bitcoin holders would individually benefit if the value of their BTC rises with the service’s adoption, and thus they are driven to back it.
This effect manifests at two tiers: the personal and the corporate. The corporate facet is a straightforward matter of incentives; large corporations will actively endorse or even establish Bitcoin-based dapps to elevate Bitcoin’s worth, simply because they are so significant that even the portion of advantage accruing to them is sufficient to outweigh the costs; this is the “speculative philanthropy” approach outlined by Daniel Krawisz.
The individual aspect is less about direct incentives; each person’s ability to influence Bitcoin’s value is minimal. Instead, it’s more an astute manipulation of psychological biases. It is well-established that individuals often modify their moral values to align with their personal interests, so the channel here is more intricate: individuals holding BTC begin to perceive it as being in the collective interest for Bitcoin to thrive, and hence they will genuinely and enthusiastically endorse such applications. Interestingly, even a modest incentive is adequate to shift people’s moral values sufficiently, creating a psychological mechanism that manages to resolve not only the coordination challenge but also, to a limited extent, the public goods dilemma.
There are multiple significant counterarguments to this assertion. First, it is far from clear that the overall impact of these incentive and psychological mechanisms indeed grows larger as the currency expands. While a greater size leads to more individuals being influenced by the incentive, a smaller size generates a more concentrated incentive, as individuals have the chance to make a meaningful impact on the success of the project. The tribal psychology underpinning incentive-driven moral adjustments may be stronger for smaller “tribes” where individuals also share robust social connections than for larger tribes where such links are more dispersed; this parallels the Gemeinschaft vs Gesellschaft distinction in sociology. Perhaps a new protocol necessitates a concentrated group of highly incentivized stakeholders to cultivate a community, and Bitcoin maximalists may be mistaken in attempting to dismantle this ladder after Bitcoin has ascended it so successfully. In any event, all research surrounding optimum currency areas will require significant reevaluation within the context of newer volatile cryptocurrencies, and the findings may very well lean in either direction.
Secondly, the capability of a network to issue units of a new coin has proven to be an incredibly effective mechanism for resolving the public goods dilemma concerning funding protocol development, and any platform that does not capitalize on the seignorage revenue from creating a new coin is at a considerable disadvantage. Up to this point, the only notable crypto 2.0 protocol development firm that has successfully financed its operations without some form of “pre-mine” or”pre-sale” refers to Blockstream (the organization behind sidechains), which recently secured $21 million in venture capital investment from investors in Silicon Valley. Considering Blockstream’s self-imposed challenges in monetizing through tokens, we are presented with three plausible justifications for how investors rationalized this funding:
- The financing was fundamentally a speculative philanthropic gesture from Silicon Valley venture capitalists aiming to enhance the worth of their BTC and other BTC-related assets.
- Blockstream plans to generate income by taking a share of the fees associated with their blockchains (non-viable as the public is likely to reject such an evident and overt centralized appropriation of resources even more forcefully than they would a new currency)
- Blockstream aims to “offer services”, for instance, embracing the RedHat model (feasible for them but not many others; it’s pertinent to note that the total space available for RedHat-style ventures is quite limited)
Both (1) and (3) present significant issues; (3) because it implies that few other firms will be able to follow its lead and it incentivizes them to weaken their protocols to enable centralized overlays, and (1) because it necessitates that crypto 2.0 enterprises must all appease the concentrated affluent elite in Silicon Valley (or potentially another concentrated wealthy elite in China), hardly a healthy dynamic for a decentralized ecosystem that prides itself on its political autonomy and disruptive character.
Ironically, the sole “independent” sidechain initiative that has so far made itself known, Truthcoin, has effectively achieved the best of both realms: the project aligned itself with the Bitcoin maximalist movement by declaring it would be a sidechain, but the development team actually intends to introduce two “coins” into the platform – one being a BTC sidechain token and the other an independent currency designed to be, that’s right, crowd-sold.
A New Strategy
Consequently, we observe that while the effects of currency networks can sometimes be moderately robust, and they will undoubtedly create a preference for Bitcoin over other existing cryptocurrencies, establishing an ecosystem that utilizes Bitcoin exclusively is a remarkably dubious undertaking, resulting in a complete decrease and heightened centralization of funding (as only the ultra-wealthy possess a sufficient concentrated incentive to engage as speculative philanthropists), closed security environments (eliminating proof of stake), and it may not even guarantee Bitcoin’s enduring willingness. Is there an alternative approach that we can pursue? Are there methods to attain the best of both realms, enjoying both currency network effects and securing the advantages of emerging protocols issuing their own coins?
It turns out, there is: the dual-currency model. This dual-currency framework, arguably innovated by Robert Sams, though in various forms independently identified by Bitshares, Truthcoin, and myself, is fundamentally straightforward: every network will host two (or even more) currencies, separating the functions of medium of exchange and vehicle for speculation and stake (the latter two functions are best merged, as noted previously, given that proof of stake is most effective when participants bear the brunt of a fork). The transactional currency will either be a Bitcoin sidechain, as in Truthcoin’s framework, or an endogenous stablecoin, or an exogenous stablecoin that benefits from the powerful currency network effect of the US dollar (or Euro or CNY or SDR or any others). Hayekian currency competition will dictate which kind of Bitcoin, altcoin, or stablecoin users favor; it is even conceivable that sidechain technology can be utilized to enable one specific stablecoin to be transferable across multiple networks.
The vol-coin will serve as the consensus measurement unit, and vol-coins will occasionally be utilized to issue new stablecoins when stablecoins are consumed for transaction fees; hence, as detailed in the linked article on stablecoins, vol-coins can be valued as a fraction of anticipated transaction fees. Vol-coins can be crowd-sold, maintaining the advantages of a crowd sale as a funding approach. If we deem explicit pre-mines or pre-sales as “unjust”, or that they foster negative incentives due to the developers’ gains being frontloaded, then we could alternatively employ voting (as in DPOS) or prediction markets to allocate coins to developers in a decentralized manner over time.
Another aspect to consider is, what becomes of the vol-coins themselves? Technological advancement is swift, and if each network is displaced within a few years, the vol-coins may never achieve significant market capitalization. One solution is to address the issue using an ingenious blend of Satoshian philosophy and classic recursive punishment systems from the physical world: establish a social norm whereby every new coin allocates 50-75% of its units to a reasonable selection of the coins that preceded it and directly inspired its development, enforcing this norm blockchain-style—if your coin does not respect its precursors, then its successors will decline to acknowledge it, instead redistributing the additional revenues between the originally wronged ancestors and themselves, and no one will criticize them for doing so. This would enable vol-coins to preserve continuity across generations. Bitcoin itself can be included in the list of ancestors for any new coin. Perhaps a consensus across the industry of this nature is what is vital to foster the kind of collaborative and amicable evolutionary competition necessary for a multichain cryptoeconomy to truly thrive.
Would we have utilized a vol-coin/stable-coin framework for Ethereum had such strategies been widely recognized six months ago? Quite possibly yes; regrettably, it’s too late for the decision to be made now at the protocol level, particularly since the ether genesis block distribution and supply model is essentially solidified. Fortunately, however, Ethereum permits users to create their own currencies within contracts, making it entirely feasible that such a system could gradually be integrated, albeit somewhat artificially, over time. Even without such a modification, ether itself will maintain a strong and stable value as a cryptofuel and as a store of value for Ethereum-based security deposits, simply due to the combination of the Ethereum blockchain’s network effect (which is indeed a platform network effect, as all contracts on the Ethereum blockchain possess a common interface and can effortlessly communicate with each other) and the weak-currency-network-effect rationale outlined for cryptofuels above ensures its stable position. For 2.0 multichain interaction, however, and for future platforms like Truthcoin, the choice regarding which new coin model to adopt is all too significant.
