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Approach, Michael Saylor and MSTR have dominated Wall Street. To the dismay of many, the suitcoiners and corporations are present: Bitcoin held by firms in the guise of bitcoin treasury companies is mesmerizing to observe. It has captivated nearly everyone\u2019s attention<\/a> \u2014 including mine.<\/p>\n It\u2019s the newest trend in global capital markets, acclaimed by a select group of astute Bitcoiners and insiders, yet loathed by tradfi individuals<\/a> who can\u2019t fathom why anyone<\/em>, let alone an enterprise, would desire bitcoin<\/a> at all. Every quirky Bitcoin podcaster has joined one or several bitcoin treasury companies as investors or advisors\u2026 or, to clarify their role more straightforwardly: as elevated marketers masquerading as retail-delivery systems.<\/p>\n In recent months, I\u2019ve contributed hundreds of hours<\/em> exploring bitcoin treasury entities. I\u2019ve perused reports and explanations, bullish puff pieces and detailed descriptions<\/a>. I\u2019ve pondered the financial-market rationale behind them. I\u2019ve refined outstanding articles advocating the justification<\/a> for<\/em> treasury firms, and overseen equally impressive counterarguments against<\/em> them<\/a>.\u00a0<\/p>\n In some minor ways, I\u2019ve even succumbed to them; I\u2019m not as staunchly opposed to them as I expressed in the June 2025 piece (\u201cAre Bitcoin Treasury Companies Ponzi Schemes?<\/a>\u201d) that was, coincidentally, presented before Michael Saylor on Fox Business last week.\u00a0<\/p>\n Here\u2019s what I\u2019ve gleaned from all of this.\u00a0<\/p>\n The simplest approach to bitcoin treasuries and financialized bitcoin is to merely disregard everything. Before Enlightenment: chop wood, hodl self-custody bitcoin; after Enlightenment: chop wood, hodl self-custody bitcoin<\/em>. Only time will reveal whether these financial instruments, brimming with corporate-enveloped bitcoin and softly-spoken CEOs, will thrive or dramatically implode.\u00a0<\/p>\n However, in discussions of finances and economics (and more broadly, economic theory), there is seldom a pleasant, impartial choice, no inaction; my funds and savings must find a destination, my focus and efforts be directed towards something<\/em>. New bitcoin treasury companies are established weekly<\/a>; energetic fund raises or acquisitions are proclaimed daily. Being <\/em>part of this domain, having an opinion is unavoidable; having a well-informed perspective looks almost like a moral responsibility.\u00a0<\/p>\n Having spent years deep-diving into the intricacies of monetary economics and financial history and now the unpredictable financial frontier of Bitcoin, the intellectual path to follow here is rather limited. One side guarantees a quick route to the hyperbitcoinized future we all envision, with corporate charters merely amplifying my sats along the journey; the other, a quagmire of financial engineering and a nest of speculative frenzy quickly lining up Bitcoiners to transform their fiat contributions into bitcoin yield.\u00a0<\/p>\n $MSTR<\/a> trades at a premium to Bitcoin NAV because of Credit Amplification, an Options Advantage, Passive Flows, and enhanced Institutional Access that equity and credit instruments offer compared to commodities. pic.twitter.com\/AYQlytS4ID<\/a><\/p>\n \u2014 Michael Saylor (@saylor) August 13, 2025<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n <\/div>\n<\/figure>\n One factor is leverage. As a typical millennial<\/a>, I lack a house and thus find no easy access to inexpensive debt (essentially the only<\/em> justification<\/a> to own a property<\/a>).\u00a0<\/p>\n I can<\/em> leverage<\/a> my coins via e.g., Firefish<\/a> (with 6-9% APR), or utilize my credit cards (11% and 19%, respectively). These terms aren\u2019t favorable; they carry a hefty cost, a fairly small capital pool, and are quite pricey. Even if bitcoin experiences a CAGR of 30-60%, that\u2019s over more extended timeframes \u2014 not monthly or annually, which is the timeline I must adhere to for servicing these types of debt.\u00a0<\/p>\n In contrast, Strategy<\/a> and MARA provide convertible debt at 0%. These<\/em> obligations mature in several years and are in the nine-figure range. Said Pierre Rochard during his debate with Jim Chanos<\/a> last month:\u00a0<\/p>\n \u201cThe ability to access the terms that Saylor has\u2026 is not available to individuals holding Bitcoin in cold storage.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n For the majority of Bitcoiners, engaging in this endeavor is proving too enticing to refuse\u2026 even if <\/em>you have to relinquish control and ownership, and additionally pay a high premium over their existing bitcoin reserves for the opportunity to own some of these shares.\u00a0<\/p>\n As a leverage mechanism, Saylor\u2019s shift towards preferred shares appears significantly more costly \u2014 paying 8-10% interest is nearing my own borrowing capacities \u2014 but they are much<\/em> safer.\u00a0<\/p>\n The preferences protect the company itself<\/em>, as they eliminate the risk of margin calls or debt-driven bankruptcy worries, and afford the company remarkable flexibility. Preferred shares act as a release valve, since Strategy can choose not<\/em> to distribute dividends for instance, STRD; doing the same for STRF<\/a> \u201conly\u201d incurs a 1% penalty moving forward. In a crunch, and without significant repercussions for the company itself, Strategy can even pause payments for the others (at the risk of zeroing out the \n“““html<\/p>\n $MSTR<\/a> is essentially unshakeable. <\/p>\n As long as BTC advances quicker than the desired yield (>10%), Strategy can continue accumulating and distributing more preferreds. <\/p>\n If BTC reaches a 30% ARR as Saylor anticipates, $MSTR<\/a> could emerge as one of the largest enterprises globally.<\/p>\n If BTC decelerates to 15%\u2026<\/p>\n \u2014 BTCoptioneer (@BTCoptioneer) August 6, 2025<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n <\/div>\n<\/figure>\n Here\u2019s the contradiction: While this represents financial leverage for Strategy, allowing it to acquire increasing amounts of external capital to invest in bitcoin and augment their<\/em> reserves, it isn\u2019t<\/em> leverage for (new) shareholders of MSTR. <\/p>\n To reference Jim Chanos\u2019 reply to Rochard in that discussion: the purpose of leverage is to have more<\/em> than $1 of exposure. If I purchase MSTR at a mNAV of 1.5, and Strategy itself has a leverage ratio around 20%, I\u2019m not leveraging up!<\/em><\/strong> <\/strong>(1\/1.5 x 1.2 = 0.8). Hence, for every $1 I invest in MSTR, I receive approximately 80 cents of bitcoin exposure. Moreover, the entity, of which that share is a fraction, still needs to compensate roughly<\/em> what I pay my financiers for the advantage of leveraging other people’s finances.<\/p>\n The evaluations for the majority of other treasury firms<\/a> are even worse<\/em>, primarily due to their inflated mNAV. You are the yield that bitcoin treasury companies are pursuing<\/em><\/a>.<\/em> When we invest in these firms, we engage in fiat games. And we partake in them directly in proportion to the costliness of the mNAV. I\u2019ve inquired<\/a> numerous times:\u00a0<\/p>\n \u201cHow<\/em> can a bitcoin, encased in a corporate framework, suddenly be\u00a0valued<\/a>\u00a0at double, triple, or tenfold the most liquid, observable, and undeniably accurate price on the globe?\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n Indeed,\u00a0<\/p>\n \u201cWhat substantial value-added transformation does our orange token undergo the instant you take it under your financially leveraged wings and pledge to issue debt, preferred shares, and equity against it \u2014\u00a0in \u201cwaves of credit bubbles,\u201d we hear Satoshi\u2019s specter faintly murmur.<\/em>\u201c<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n Strategy\u2019s remarkable revelation \u2014 which everyone is now eagerly emulating \u2014 is that enclosing a bitcoin in a corporate shell, applying some leverage on it, and marketing it on Wall Street somehow renders that same bitcoin worth multiples of its true market value.\u00a0<\/p>\n A significant portion of the dialogue concludes there, with traditional finance journalists quick to dismiss this as a trend or a bubble; according to the efficient market hypothesis, or simply common sense, nothing should trade above<\/em> the value of the singular asset it possesses.\u00a0<\/p>\n Not sufficient. Let\u2019s summarize some quite valid reasons<\/a> as to why corporate stocks solely focused on acquiring bitcoin should carry a value greater<\/em> than the bitcoin they retain:\u00a0<\/p>\n Total: <\/em>10+5+20+20 equals 55\u2026 and conveniently approximately<\/em> where MSTR traded<\/a> when I initially waved my hand to justify these premium rationales. At a bitcoin price<\/a> of $122,500, the 628,791 BTC on Strategy\u2019s balance sheet is valued at around $77 billion, while the firm’s market capitalization stands at $110 billion (~45%<\/strong> premium).\u00a0<\/p>\n $MSTR<\/a> is traded at a premium relative to Bitcoin NAV due to Credit Amplification, an Options Advantage, Passive Flows, and superior Institutional Access that equity and credit instruments offer compared to commodities. pic.twitter.com\/AYQlytS4ID<\/a><\/p>\n \u2014 Michael Saylor (@saylor) August 13, 2025<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n <\/div>\n<\/figure>\n Not in the sense that accepts (bitcoin) deposits and offers (bitcoin) loans, but in a different, more profoundly economic manner.<\/p>\n You might regard banking as one of society\u2019s methods for sharing risk. Society extends credit to various risky enterprises, and capital markets \u2014 a segment in which the banking system operates \u2014 allocate the associated risk levels. (Essentially, a financial \u201cWho Gets What and Why<\/a>.\u201d)<\/p>\n A bank<\/em>, from an economic perspective, is an organization that assumes that risk while possessing some non-public details about the parties involved; it offers a modest, guaranteed return to the lender, while it profits from any prosperous venture \u2014 albeit not as extensively as the equity owner. If the bank achieves this effectively, i.e., it typically selects successful projects and earns more in interest on creditworthy loans than it disburses in interest to depositors, it generates profit for itself.<\/p>\n This is the essence of what Strategy is executing, leveraging the unexplored territory between the bitcoin realm and the fiat realm.<\/strong> <\/p>\n Traditional finance entities, pension funds, or retirees represent the bank-financing aspect of this framework. They \u201cdeposit\u201d funds in Strategy, with returns and terms defined by the particular tranche they select (STRK, STRD, STRF, STRC, or residual claimant in common stock, MSTR).<\/p>\n The bank allocates these resources into assets: Strategy occupies a central position, assuring payouts to these economic entities by forecasting that the assets will yield returns surpassing the stated interest on the \u201cbank deposits.\u201d Instead of a bank extending loans for mortgages and credit cards and to small enterprises, Strategy\u2019s lending aspect comprises a singular client: the world\u2019s most successful asset. What Strategy is undertaking is the (very logical) wager that bitcoin will appreciate in dollar value faster than the 8-10% it must pay traditional fiat institutions for the privilege of utilizing their funds.<\/p>\n Any middle-schooler equipped with a calculator can ascertain that limitless wealth awaits if you’re borrowing at 10% annually to acquire an asset that grows by 40% each year.<\/p>\n Of course, bitcoin doesn\u2019t<\/em> provide a neat, cozy, 40% a year. If that were the case, per Michael Saylor\u2019s own assertions<\/a>, Warren Buffett would have snatched up all the bitcoin <\/em>long before now:<\/p>\n \u201cIf bitcoin were not volatile, individuals with more wealth than you, more influence than you, would outbid you for the bitcoin; you couldn\u2019t possess it\u2026 At the moment it becomes entirely predictable, Warren Buffet will announce \u2018oh yes; we understand; we just acquired all the bitcoin\u2019\u2026 and your chance is gone.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n All that Strategy needs to secure is that the financing won\u2019t lead to its bankruptcy; that the issuance is firmly within its control and discretion; that dividend payouts are conservatively enough compared to the net capital it holds (i.e., bitcoin); and, most crucially, that the liabilities aren\u2019t callable<\/em> in a way that would compel the company to liquidate bitcoin at unfavorable times.<\/p>\n Essentially, Saylor devised a vehicle highly suited<\/em> to navigate through extreme downturns. Even an 80% drop in bitcoin \u2014 the most severe of its kind<\/a>, and it\u2019s certainly debatable whether those will occur again, given the size and public accessibility of the asset \u2014 won\u2019t hinder the company. The essence of a successful Ponzi<\/a> is that the funds must continually flow in. More specifically, Strategy is conservatively Ponzi-like in its financing<\/em> (unlike traditional \u2014 fraudulent \u2014 Ponzi schemes, Saylor isn\u2019t perpetrating a fraud; the perception just coincides<\/a>, and no one is defrauded\u2026 unwillingly, at least).<\/p>\n What neither traditional finance journalists nor treasury-skeptic Bitcoiners have articulated well is how<\/em> precisely these schemes unravel. For \u201cEconomic Forces,\u201d economist Josh Hendrickson<\/a> succinctly outlines the pertinent stumbling blocks: \u201cIf markets are segmented<\/strong> and there is an anticipation that prices will continue to rise quickly, this makes the present discounted value of a future liquidation exceed the current liquidation value. If the stock is selling at its current liquidation value, it is undervalued.\u201d And:<\/p>\n \u201cwhat MicroStrategy has accomplished is transform itself into a bitcoin bank by issuing dollar-denominated liabilities and acquiring bitcoin. The company is explicitly engaged in financial engineering to take advantage of regulatory arbitrage.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n Strategy\u2019s framework, but more importantly the other imitators given their respective jurisdictional advantages<\/a>, can thus fail if<\/em>:<\/p>\n The flywheel effect, so creatively coined by the Twitterati of the Bitcoin community, refers to the capacity to exploit regulatory arbitrage, which, in turn, \u201cdepends on investors sustaining this expectation that bitcoin will be significantly more valuable in the future,\u201d in Hendrickson<\/a>\u2019s very academic and economic phrasing.<\/p>\n Shareholders and purchasers of the preferred shares won\u2019t be pleased in the case of dividend nonpayment. Shareholders of MSTR itself will resent dilution merely to accommodate bondholders (or worse, and Ponzi-like<\/a>) pay the interest to preferreds. But so what<\/em>? It doesn\u2019t dismantle Strategy<\/em>.<\/p>\n What will dismantle the model is the removal of these traditional finance-to-bitcoin barriers. It\u2019s the regulatory challenges that advanced many of these firms; transformed them into financial bridges between the new economy and the old; enabled them to absorb unproductive<\/a>, low-yielding<\/a> capital from across the globe and redirect it into bitcoin. <\/p>\n If fund managers or treasury departments or family offices consistently accumulate bitcoin instead of various Strategy offerings (or securities of Strategy imitators, as may be the case in different regions), the fundamental rationale for bitcoin treasury enterprises dissipates. <\/p>\n The continuity of bitcoin treasury firms, succinctly stated, rests on the inertia of the current system. It crucially relies on family offices and pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and traditional investors not<\/em> undertaking the effort to uncover There is certainly a custodian risk for Strategy, with its coins held by various custodians, and in solutions that are deliberately maintained rather opaque<\/a>. What occurs to Strategy\u2019s operations if, for instance, Coinbase files for bankruptcy? Or worse, if emerging political dynamics usher in confiscation and\/or harsh taxation policies?<\/p>\n Fair enough, these are tail risks but nonetheless risks.\u00a0<\/p>\n And \u2014 it\u2019s almost mundane to mention this \u2014 if Bitcoin somehow falters, certainly<\/em> Strategy falters with it. If bitcoin remains a $118,000 stablecoin indefinitely, the majority of Strategy\u2019s opportunistic usage of abundant financial capital becomes rather irrelevant, and it\u2019ll behave like the collection of bitcoin that numerous journalists and various analysts believe it to be, its remarkable growth (largely) vanished.\u00a0<\/p>\n And I believe that<\/em>\u2019s what confounds so many journalists<\/a> and analysts<\/a> when examining this treasury company trend: If you cannot comprehend how or why bitcoin<\/em> would ever hold value or applicability, especially in the future of finance and currency, then evidently a corporation dedicated to acquiring as much bitcoin as it can seems utterly nonsensical<\/em>.<\/p>\n Intellectual modesty compels us to accept that perhaps, just perhaps<\/em>, we miscalculated something.\u00a0<\/p>\n Diamond hands are continuously formed\u2026 and mine remain quite fragile. It genuinely worries me when the bitcoin price plummets sharply. (It\u2019s the abrupt extremity of it, I believe, that\u2019s significant\u2026 and I find it challenging to rationalize even in retrospect<\/em>).<\/em> I act impulsively, lash out \u2014 and not infrequently take reckless risks with rent funds or other reserves of extra cash that really shouldn\u2019t be allocated to bitcoin.\u00a0<\/p>\n In bullish markets, that kind of conduct generally serves me well\u2026 but eventually, it won\u2019t. Morgen Rochard, during one of these endless<\/a> guest appearances<\/a> on the Bitcoin podcast circuit, emphasized this point. (I sometimes say that Morgen has, paradoxically, encouraged me to own less<\/em> bitcoin than I currently do\u2026 sleep peacefully at night, be composed in the face of price fluctuations<\/a>, etc, etc.)\u00a0<\/p>\n The more I discover regarding Strategy, the more I\u2019m warming up to its numerous tailored offerings. It makes some<\/em> degree of sense for me to possess e.g., STRC for short-term liquidity and STRK for limited bitcoin exposure coupled with cash flow. STRK, from a financial standpoint, resembles holding bitcoin twice removed; short-term variations in price would be significantly less volatile, and it would provide me with a bit of extra fiat side income.<\/p>\n Given that my net worth and professional roles are primarily linked to bitcoin and influenced by bitcoin price movements, having slightly less<\/em> of my net worth in this all-in-one area is logical.<\/p>\n Great inquiry. Two reasons: they don\u2019t generate much\u2026 checks notes<\/em>\u2026 4.05% interest on my \u201chigh-yield\u201d dollar account. Saylor\u2019s analogous product, STRC<\/a>, aims for a rate hundreds of basis points higher; and STRK, which in the medium term mirrors bitcoin itself, adjusted for changes in MSTR\u2019s mNAV (since at MSTR = $1,000, ten STRK converts), currently yields over 7%. Secondly, knowing myself, I\u2019m fairly certain I\u2019ll just dive cash reserves held in a fiat bank account into bitcoin at the first indication of a notable price drop; maintaining STRC or STRK in a brokerage account would at least raise the barriers to that<\/em> kind of reckless behavior.\u00a0<\/p>\n You only really need to possess two assets now. <\/p>\n Bitcoin and $STRC<\/a>.<\/p>\n Financial planning just became a whole lot simpler.<\/p>\n \u2014 James Van Straten (@btcjvs) August 9, 2025<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n <\/div>\n<\/figure>\n Since I\u2019m already structurally short fiat \u2014 as per the original Speculative Attack<\/a>, I carry debt and<\/em> bitcoin, thus I\u2019m leveraged long \u2014 it\u2019s prudent to\u2026 deep breath\u2026 <\/em>diversify<\/a>, just a little bit!\u00a0<\/p>\n I consistently maximally contribute to the pension fund that my I regard that contribution as <\/p>\n 1) tax reduction (I deeply dislike the government, experiencing immense displeasure at every cent paid) \u2014 Joakim Book (@joakimbook) June 28, 2025<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n <\/div>\n<\/figure>\n Additionally, contributing to it comes with substantial tax benefits: Maximizing the contribution grants me about 1.5x the funds immediately. While those supplementary resources will be eclipsed by bitcoin\u2019s typical ~40% CAGR in less than a couple of years, they also come with tax-exempt mortgage advantages; should I wish to acquire a The opportunity cost of bitcoin is significant, and over time quite burdensome, but this isn’t a matter of conviction. Real-life considerations prevail: It makes a world<\/em> of difference for how you What relevance does any of this have with bitcoin treasury companies?!<\/em><\/p>\n A lot: since the protective mindset of \u201cwhat if I\u2019m mistaken about this\u201d prevails here too.<\/p>\n Despite all the hype and sophisticated jargon, along with new metrics and futuristic aspirations, I still struggle to understand why a bitcoin, when encased in a corporate framework, should hold greater<\/em> value than a standalone bitcoin. Yes, yes, net-present-value of projected growth, yield, capital arbitrage, speculative challenges, and a wager on hyperbitcoinized banking but\u2026 seriously?!<\/em><\/p>\n Alright, what if I\u2019m mistaken? Numerous<\/em> individuals I trust within the Bitcoin ecosystem endorse these points \u2014 more frequently, it seems \u2014 and there is<\/em> some rationale behind them. Cheap leverage, speculative attacks, enticing (read: deceiving) fiat reserves to flow into bitcoin.\u00a0<\/p>\n …so I FOMO\u2019d into two treasury companies lately: Two Strategy products (MSTR and STRK) and the Swedish newcomer H100<\/a>.<\/p>\n A decade plus ago, I used to possess a significant number of stocks \u2014 large, well-diversified portfolios<\/a>, meticulously monitored. For years<\/em> now, and for apparent reasons, I haven\u2019t owned any.\u00a0<\/p>\n I opted for Strategy\u2019s offerings because they are the least financially reckless in this domain; the second one due to my easy access via my traditional Nordic<\/a> bank accounts \u2014 and I wasn\u2019t about to go through the trouble of locating a suitable brokerage, signing documents, and transferring funds just to possibly<\/em> engage with a few hundred bucks of bitcoin treasury money. There\u2019s already plenty of frustrating paperwork out there<\/em>.\u00a0<\/p>\n In the unlikely event that these assets yield anything, Strategy will be involved, managing the operations: MSTR is \u201camplified bitcoin<\/a>,\u201d as their marketing puts it. Given that most of my savings are orange-themed and my professional existence is deeply orange, this kind of diversification resonates. (Moreover, the mNAV for MSTR is swiftly nearing one\u2026 1.42 as I write this.)\u00a0<\/p>\n With Emil Sandstedt\u2019s words echoing in my mind \u2014 I grasp that I<\/em> am<\/em> the BTC yield they\u2019re pursuing \u2014 but with a BTC yield around 25% and a safe 20% leverage through the prefs and convertibles, I\u2019ll find myself even at this time next year: My ~150 dollars\u2019 worth of MSTR shares currently delivers about 120 dollars\u2019 worth of bitcoin exposure; I\u2019m content to invest the extra $30 for the financial empire Mr. Saylor is building (and the potential growth in bitcoin-per-share<\/a>).\u00a0<\/p>\n Secondly, H100. The mNAV here was also reasonably acceptable for a small, agile, fast-moving and jurisdictionally<\/a> strong player \u2014 at 2.73, ugh<\/em> \u2014 but its low days-to-cover rate<\/a> reassures me that I won\u2019t get too<\/em> trapped.\u00a0<\/p>\n My initial realization after purchasing some: I\u2019d forgotten how enjoyable it is!<\/em> <\/p>\nWhat Should a Rational, Ordinary Bitcoiner Do?\u00a0<\/strong><\/h2>\n
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Why Would a Bitcoiner Engage with These Firms?<\/h2>\n
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bondholder<\/s> bagholder, and undoubtedly leaving many disgruntled).<\/p>\n\n
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Strategy is a Bank: The Economic Vision<\/h2>\n
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\ncurrent<\/em> bitcoin involvement (along with some secure, prudent leverage). If they opt against this, and instead choose to pay an additional 50% for the privilege, then\u2026 indeed<\/em>, the bitcoin treasury enterprises’ business frameworks are perpetually viable.\u00a0<\/p>\nWhat Else Could Go Awry?<\/h3>\n
The Hedge and The FOMO: What If I\u2019m Mistaken?<\/h2>\n
Why Not Simply Keep Cash in a High-Yield Savings Account?<\/h3>\n
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Hedges\u2026 Hedges Everywhere<\/h3>\n
jurisdiction<\/s> local authority obligates me to pay into. The assets within that sanctioned wrapper invest broadly in stocks and bonds (approximately 75:25 ratio); compared to any bitcoin comparison, these naturally perform poorly<\/em>, but in case I\u2019m somehow \u2014 for some unfathomable reason \u2014 incorrect about this entire money-printing, central banking-ending situation, at least I won\u2019t starve in my later years:\u00a0<\/p>\n\n
2) A type of hedge in case I’m gravely mistaken on this orange revolution (my career, employment, and net worth is already heavily influenced by BTC)<\/p>\nhouse<\/s> real-world asset someday, I can utilize this pool of funds for that purpose.\u00a0<\/p>\n
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\nlive your life<\/a> whether hyperbitcoinization occurs in a week or in a century.\u00a0<\/p>\nIt\u2019s Great to Have Stocks Again\u2026<\/h2>\n